Impact of Corporate Lobbying on Board Compensation and Audit Quality

Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance

دوره 4، شماره 3، آبان 2020، صفحه 1-15   

نوع مقاله: Original Article

شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22067/ijaaf.2020.39425

نویسندگان

Nader Naghshbandi¹؛ Hadi Saeidi²؛ Ghasem Elahi Shirvan²؛ Shaban Mohammadi^{* 3}

¹Department of Accounting, Hakim Nezami institution of higher education, Quchan, Iran

²Department of Accounting, Shirvan Branch, Islamic Azad University, Shirvan, Iran

³Instructor of Accounting, Shahid Rajaee Faculty, Vocational University of Khorasan, Iran

چکیده

Corporate lobbying is one of the most important ways companies, society, and even citizens can directly and legally influence the development and implementation of new laws and regulations. Theoretically, lobbying can be a threat to auditor independence as well. This study investigates the impact of corporate lobbying on board compensation and audit quality. Using a sample of 150 companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange over period 2012-2018, the study shows that corporate lobbying has a significant impact on board compensation and audit quality. This is the first study investigating the impact of corporate lobbying on board compensation and audit quality of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

کلیدواژه‌ها

Audit quality؛ Corporate Lobbying؛ Board Compensation؛ Auditor tenure؛ Stock Exchange؛ Stock returns

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