Geopolitical Analysis of the Functioning of the International Criminal Court on the Africa Continent

پژوهش ‎های جغرافیای سیاسی

Article 3, Volume 4, Issue 1 - Serial Number 13, October 2019, Pages 63-95   

Document Type: مقالات علمی -پژوهشی

DOI: 10.22067/pg.v4i1.82852

Authors

Meysam Gholami^* ; Seyyed Mehdi Seyyedzadeh Sani

Ferdowsi University of Mashhad

Abstract

Extended Abstract

Introduction

The International Criminal Court was set up on July 1, 2002, as the first permanent international tribunal to establish individual responsibility for all perpetrators of international crimes and to end Immunity of heads of state from prosecution. According to the Statute and the purposes of the Tribunal, its jurisdiction must be exercised universally and without discrimination in respect of the offenses committed by its member States and nationals, as well as in cases referred to the Security Council.
However, in spite of committing international crimes around the world, we find that the Tribunal focuses only on the crimes committed in the African continent Because of the ten out of twelve cases under consideration in the Tribunal, are in the African continent.  The same issue has attracted a lot of criticism, especially from the heads of African governments, so that even some International Criminal Tribunals refer to it as the African International Criminal Court and the African governments believe that the power of the Court is Geopolitical issues and approaches that have existed for a long time have been confined to the African continent and incapable of investigating other crimes committed on other continents. Thus, the African governments have serious doubts about the Court's independence and impartiality, have raised political concerns about the Court's work and refuse to cooperate with the Court while threatening to withdraw from the Court.
In this article, in response to the question of the extent to which the African government has criticized the Tribunal, it is necessary to first examine how the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is exercised and to answer the following questions: What is the role of the Tribunal in the majority of the aforementioned African State cases? What are the geopolitical reasons for the Court's focus on the African continent? What has the Tribunal done to commit crimes on other continents?

Review of Literature

It has been nearly two decades since the establishment of the International Criminal Court. During this period many books and articles have been written in this field. However, there has been no comprehensive study of the performance of the Tribunal in the special continent, and in particular in the African continent, has not been extensively studied by researchers, and only a few authors have briefly examined the African continent's case and the reactions of African heads of state to the performance of the Tribunal.
What distinguishes the present work from all other works is that is not limited to examining the response of African governments to the functioning of the Tribunal, but it attempts to assess the Tribunal's violation of the Statute, in a more comprehensive view of the geopolitical reasons for the Court's focus on the African continent. The question of whether the Court's performance is politically motivated or not, as well as evaluating the Court's actions on other continents, will be examined. Therefore, the innovation and novelty aspects of research are considered.

3. Method

The present research, which is among the theoretical fundamental researches due to its legal and political nature, is discussed from a geopolitical point of view. Accordingly, this study can be considered as an interdisciplinary study of international criminal and geopolitical law. The sources used in this research are, by its theoretical nature, documentary and library sources.

4. Findings and Discussion

The Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted on July 17, 1998 to deal with the criminalization of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression. The establishment of this permanent institution promised to reduce the incidence of these crimes. However, in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, including the Court's supplementary jurisdiction, the court became the "last resort".
One of the main reasons for the supplementary jurisdiction of the Court is the concern of governments about the power of the Tribunal to violate national sovereignty and its involvement in matters concerning the criminal jurisdiction of national courts. Because the issue of prosecution of international crimes is closely linked to the sovereignty of states. Therefore, the statutes of the statute are designed to respect the national sovereignty of states and to add more states to the statute of the court. To date, there are 122 members of the Tribunal; 33 are African, 18 are Asia-Pacific, 18 are Eastern European, 28 are Latin American and Caribbean, and 25 are Western European and other countries.
 However, the Court's review of its performance indicates that the Court has failed to meet its universal purpose. Because the Court's consideration of situation and cases indicates that the Court is focused on the African continent, and African governments believe that the Court's power has long been limited to the African continent due to geopolitical issues and approaches. It has not been able to investigate other crimes committed on other continents.

Conclusion

Based on the result of this study, the criticism of why the Tribunal does not deal with crimes committed elsewhere in the world is based on the Court's performance. However, the investigative phase is only one step in the Court and prior to that; there is a preliminary assessment of the situation. At present, several situations are in the process of evaluation, most of which concern non-African countries.
However, in view of the Court's jurisdiction in the Statute, the African Government's criticism of the Court's lack of geopolitical focus on the African continent does not apply. Because of the ten Situation African states, five in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic one and two and Mali by the African governments themselves, two by Libya and Sudan by the Security Council, and only three by the Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya and Burundi have been investigated by the prosecutor. In addition, the following can be cited as rejecting the African government's criticism of the Court's focus on the African continent.
The first is due to the geopolitical and deplorable state of Africa itself compared to other continents. The second reason relates to the functioning of the Security Council, which is often accompanied by political and discriminatory considerations. The Security Council has so far only referred the situation in the African continent (Sudan and Libya) to the Tribunal. The third reason relates to the Statute of the Tribunal because the Tribunal is unable to deal with all crimes within its jurisdiction due to financial and administrative constraints.  
 
 
 

Keywords

International Criminal Court; Geopolitics; African States; Extraordinary African Courts

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