The Role of the Efficiency of the Judicial System in Ease of Doing Business

دانشنامه حقوق اقتصادی

Article 4, Volume 21, Issue 5, July 2014   

Document Type: Scientific research

DOI: 10.22067/le.v21i5.48144

Authors

Abolfazl Shahabadi^* ; Roghayeh Pouran

Abstract

Nowadays, the effort for ease of doing business is the more important worry in transition economies in the way of reaching in economic development and high competitiveness. According to intuitionalism theories, the inefficiency of judicial system causes to increase trade costs, and so, violates the business environment. By studying the rank of Iran's ease in doing business between other world countries in during 2005- 2013 can find the position of Iran is significantly unsuitable. Also, by studying the indexes of Iran's efficiency of the judicial system and comparing with the best and worst countries can show the defection of Iran's judicial system is the duration for proceeding the litigations. As a result, this factor is important role in ease of contracts enforcement and the ease of doing business. Accordingly, this case should be reformed in judicial system of Iran.

Keywords

the ease of doing business; the efficiency of the judicial system; contracts enforcing

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