نقش کارائی سیستم قضائی در سهولت کسب و کار

دانشنامه حقوق اقتصادی

مقاله 4، دوره 21، شماره 5، تیر 1393   

نوع مقاله: علمی پژوهشی

شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22067/le.v21i5.48144

نویسندگان

ابوالفضل شاه‌آبادی^{* 1}؛ رقیه پوران²

¹دانشگاه بوعلی سینا، همدان

²دانشگاه الزهراء

چکیده

امروزه تلاش برای بهبود محیط کسب‌ و کار، از جمله مهم‌ترین دغدغه‌های اقتصادهای در‌حال‌گذر جهت حصول سریع‌تر به توسعه اقتصادی و رقابت است. طبق نظریات نهادگرایانه، ناکارائی در سیستم قضائی، موجب افزایش هزینه مبادلات شده و از این طریق در محیط کسب‌ و کار اختلال ایجاد می‌کند.
مطالعه رتبه سهولت کسب‌ و کار ایران در میان کشورهای جهان طی 2013 -2005 حاکی از وضعیت نامناسب کسب و کار اقتصادی ایران است. هم‌چنین، مطالعه شاخص‌های کارائی سیستم قضائی ایران و مقایسه آن با بهترین و بدترین کشورها، نشان می‌دهد که ضعف سیستم قضائی ایران در مدت‌ زمان رسیدگی به دعاوی قضائی است و از آنجا‌که این عامل نقش مهمی در سهولت اجرای قراردادها و به تبع آن، سهولت کسب‌ و کار اقتصادی دارد، اصلاح این مورد در سیستم قضائی به شدت احساس می‌شود.

کلیدواژه‌ها

سهولت کسب‌و کار؛ کارائی نظام قضائی؛ اجرای قراردادها

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