In this paper, Derrida's viewpoint on the need to teach philosophy in schools and universities to improve the quality of student's thinking is examined. The development of thinking in students is one of the fundamental factors in the transformation of education, and teaching philosophy as thinking from Derrida's perspective provides the philosophical context for this transformation. In this study, descriptive–analytical research method is used. To explain the problem and answer the questions, a selection of the philosophical foundations of Derrida's thought is stated, emphasizing the need to teach philosophy for thinking in schools and universities. The findings suggest that teaching philosophy, which is according to Derrida a kind of education for thinking, necessarily includes thinking about the school and the question of what is the philosophy of education. Philosophical thinking should also be combined with thinking about _and beyond_ philosophy, to allow the university to practice philosophy and challenge it at the same time. Therefore, thinking, in the broad, affirmative sense Derrida ascribes to it, is essential to both school and university, then the two institutions should be placed along the same continuum, differing in degree but not in kind.
Keywords: teaching philosophy; education for thinking; school; university; Derrida
Synopsis
The concept of thinking holds a central position in the educational matters that Derrida addresses, encompassing teaching philosophy in both school settings and university roles. Despite the distinction between schoolchildren and adult students, these realms are inherently linked. The discourse on teaching philosophy in schools is intricately intertwined with the institutional inquiries that arise in discussions about the university.
In both schools and universities, Derrida emphasizes the pivotal role of thinking in relation to philosophy. This paper aims to critique the conventional perspectives prevalent in teaching philosophy within educational institutions. It seeks to analyze the interconnections among thinking, education, and philosophy from the vantage point of Derrida's philosophy. The study endeavors to address several key inquiries: What is the imperative of teaching philosophy as a form of thinking within school education? What responsibilities and roles do universities hold in teaching philosophy for critical thought? Lastly, how do these two educational institutions intersect in their approach to teaching philosophy as a mode of thinking?
To address these inquiries using a deconstructive approach, this study first scrutinizes the essentiality of teaching philosophy as a form of thinking in schools and delves into the specific roles undertaken by universities in this context. Subsequently, leveraging Derrida's philosophy, it endeavors to dismantle the artificial segregation in teaching thinking between school and university settings.
Primarily, Derrida's advocacy for teaching philosophy often represents a call to challenge traditional philosophies, particularly those aligned with state ideologies. Hence, he advocates for teaching deconstruction or, in essence, teaching critical thinking.
Furthermore, Derrida points out that restricting philosophy to a certain age restricts it to a certain social class, the “social class of philosophy”, the class whose young members have what it takes to become “natural”, to succeed in the non-philosophical studies seen as conditional to the study of philosophy. The class of philosophy is “a class for one class, bourgeois youth between puberty and their entrance into adult life, with an education that was more literary than scientific, led to consider as natural and eternal a very singular program that is eclectic-baroque but also quite favorable to a particular ideological framework. It is therefore exclusive in a twofold sense: it excludes from philosophy whatever seems to be “unnatural”, whatever contradicts (or is in tension with) the philosophy of the state (Derrida 2002), and it excludes from the class of philosophy whoever is not part of the philosophical class, the class that knows what should be accepted as natural. This is how the teaching of philosophy becomes – if it has not always been – a means for reproducing and preserving not only the state but also the class of philosophers, the Platonic social hierarchy keeping philosophy for the elites and the elites for philosophy (Derrida & Kamuf, 2002).
The kind of philosophy Derrida positions vis-à-vis the philosophy of the state, this philosophy that is also anti-philosophy is sometimes called “deconstruction”, and at other times simply “thinking”: philosophical teaching that challenges rather than reproduces the philosophy of the state is education for thinking (Snir, 2020).
That is to say, the thinking Derrida refers to is attentive to otherness, to the alterity of the other (Biesta & Egéa-Kuehne, 2005). It is committed to the other of philosophy, to the non-philosophical that makes philosophy possible while still eluding it, remaining untaught by it. The deconstructive affirmation is not simply an affirmation of what is known to be excluded by the system. Deconstruction is an affirmation of what is wholly other, of what is unforeseeable from the present. We can see that the “other” that thinking affirms is an expression of the madness, which had to be confined for a space of rational discourse to be opened but was never fully dispensed with.
Derrida makes this link between madness and the affirmation of the other explicit. The language of the other, Derrida says, is the voice of madness, of whatever is not fully comprehensible in “my” language, in the language of rational discourse in which I am currently immersed. Hosting the other without assimilating him or her is not only an ethical imperative, but also a vital need of thinking itself: without affirming the others, listening to their voices, and responding to them, thinking only reproduces itself, and does more of the same. Hence, madness does not threaten thinking but rather looks after it by breathing new life into it.
How can such thinking, which unlike the philosophy of the state has neither positive doctrine nor a solid foundation from which to take its questions, be taught? For Derrida there is no direct answer, one cannot go straight to the teaching of thinking. Deconstruction is not a philosophical technique and no thinking skills can be learned to practice it. Yet although thinking cannot be taught, it can still be called for; one can create a place for it to dwell in, where it can feel at home. Derrida addresses this question through thinking about the institutions in which deconstructive thinking can take place (Derrida, 2002).
The importance of philosophy in schools notwithstanding, this institution, at least in the last 200 years or so, is undoubtedly the university. We turn now to Derrida’s discussion of the place of philosophy and thinking – and consequently of madness – in the university. Although the university, like any institution, presents itself as neutral, even as natural – an arena in which philosophy can thrive, Derrida argues that it necessarily harbors forces and interests (Derrida, 2004), excluding from its class of philosophy whatever seems to contradict them. The university, in other words, is simultaneously the condition of possibility as well as the condition of impossibility of philosophy in the present time: it makes philosophy possible and provides it with prestige and legitimation and at the same time polices and confines it. The aim of deconstruction is therefore to think philosophically about whatever remains outside the scope of institutional, academic philosophy, including the academic institution itself and the way it influences philosophy and thinking.
Derrida calls, therefore, to turn the university into a site for thinking, opening within its space for a community of thinking – rather than a community of research, science, or philosophy, since these values are most often subjected to the unquestioned authority of the principle of reason, namely to a specific configuration of reason. Thinking, then, needs to reflect on the principle of reason, and submit it to critique, without altogether abandoning it: “‘Thinking’ requires both the principle of reason and what is beyond the principle of reason, the archer and an-archy (Derrida, 2004). A community of thinking is a philosophical community that can – sometimes, in the blink of an eye – be anarchic and challenge the institution hosting it as well as its philosophy.
The educational dialogue between master and disciple, therefore, can be read as a paradigmatic case in which an idiosyncratic madness is silenced and confined to create a discourse, a common language. Education here means letting the student into an already existing discourse, through the inculcation of some form of thought, some form of logos. Hence, educating a student involves silencing some of his voices, and declaring some of his (actual or possible) thoughts mad to make him think properly. When Derrida tries to break away from the shadow of the teacher, to become a philosopher and a thinker with his voice, he must set something of this confined madness free. The Derridean text, therefore, is made possible through a double relation to Foucault’s teaching and Foucault the teacher: the teacher first educates the student, provides him with knowledge and a proper way of thinking, and then the student challenges the teacher, goes against him to develop his unique voice, namely think by himself.
In this way, an educational model can be reached, an educational model acknowledging the role of madness, namely one that is aware that education necessarily represses some kinds of madness and acknowledges the need to open a space for them. Teachers, each in their way, provide their real and imaginary students with bodies of knowledge containing madness, thereby allowing sensitive students to make their way within and beyond the given discourse, namely to think for themselves. Such teaching is probably quite rare, but it is not unusual and exceptional. There is no reason to assume it can be practiced only by individual, unusual teachers (Karimzadeh, 2021).
Conclusion
Is what has been said about thinking at the university relevant also to thinking at school? The answer seems to be positive. Indeed, these two institutions seem to be very different: the former focuses on research and the latter on teaching, and the former targets adults and the latter children – but one of the main characteristics of deconstructive thinking is the challenging of simplistic dichotomies. Hence, although Derrida himself dedicates different texts to discussing the school and the university, his thought invites the deconstruction of the dichotomy according to which schools are for children to learn and universities are for adults to do research. We will not pursue the claim that children can attend the university, nor that school does produce knowledge. We conclude by suggesting that if thinking, in the broad, affirmative sense Derrida ascribes to it, is essential to both school and university, then the two institutions are or rather should be placed along the same continuum, differing in degree but not in kind. Discussing the importance of encouraging non-instrumental, resistant thinking in the university, if such resistance begins only in the university, it is far too late and the professor professing resistance will find his or herself in confrontation with students not just disposed but quite committed to non-critical modes of thought, students with an overwhelming tendency to regard themselves as informed, autonomous consumers of an educational product. This is undoubtedly true from Derrida’s perspective. But we miss the point when going on to say that, the solution must be to give philosophy the right already possessed by every other discipline to have students work through a long and progressive curriculum beginning in the earliest classes.
Derrida's insistence on integrating thinking within education isn't a plea for incremental advancement, where students gradually ascend to higher levels of critical thinking. Critical, deconstructive thinking, as per Derrida, entails embracing the unpredictability, the 'otherness,' that diverges from conventional philosophical thought. Being prepared for thinking that navigates through this 'madness' isn't something one can specifically anticipate. Instead, according to Derrida, everyone is inherently predisposed to engage in such thinking.
Additionally, in contemplating the continuum between school and university, it becomes crucial for schools, akin to universities, to engage in self-reflection—to critically examine themselves and the educational institution they comprise. According to Derrida, teaching philosophy in schools, as a form of education for thinking, inherently involves contemplating the nature of the school itself and the fundamental question of what defines a school. In essence, philosophy in the context of schools inevitably becomes philosophy of education. |
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