CEOs’ Decision-making Power and Stock Price Crash Risk: Evidence from Iran

Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance

مقاله 1، دوره 2، شماره 3، آبان 2018، صفحه 29-47   

نوع مقاله: Accounting

شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22067/ijaaf.v3i1.79002

نویسندگان

Hamid Zarei^{* 1}؛ Mohsen Dahmarde Ghaleno²؛ Hossein JafariJam¹؛ Fatemeh Rakhshani³

¹Sistan and Baluchistan University

²Higher Educational Complex of Saravan

³University of sistan and baluchistan

چکیده

The aim of the current paper is to examine whether the chief executive officer’s (CEOs’) decision-making power effects stock price crash risk. Using an index that encompasses CEO duality, ownership power and CEO tenure as the sources of CEO power and negative conditional return skewness to measure stock price crash risk, empirical findings sufficiently reveal that there is a significant and reverse relation between CEOs’ decision-making power and stock price crash risk. The results prove that among three determinant of CEOs’ decision-making power, CEO tenure provides the most significant impact on decision-making power. The paper reliably provides sufficient evidence of CEOs’ decision-making power implications and progressively expands the academic literature on stock price crash risk. These findings provide further insights on the importance of CEO power in driving stock price crash risk and emphasize that improving CEOs’ decision-making power mitigates stock price crash risk in the context of Iran as a developing country.

کلیدواژه‌ها

CEO duality؛ CEOs’ tenure؛ Ownership Power؛ stock price crash risk

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