تحلیل اثرات تعاملی حکمرانی خوب و دولت رانتیر بر بی‌ثباتی سیاسی کشورهای عضو اوپک با استفاده از روش گشتار تعمیم‌یافته GMM

اقتصاد و توسعه منطقه ای

مقاله 7، دوره 27، شماره 19، خرداد 1399، صفحه 165-196   

نوع مقاله: مقالات پژوهشی

شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22067/erd.2021.18817.0

نویسندگان

نجات محمدی فر^{* 1}؛ بهروز صادقی عمروآبادی²

¹استادیارگروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم انسانی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه اردکان، اردکان، ایران

²استادیار گروه اقتصاد، دانشکده اقتصاد و علوم اجتماعی، گروه اقتصاد، دانشگاه شهید چمران اهواز، اهواز، ایران

چکیده

این مقاله به بررسی اثرات تعاملی دولت رانتیر و حکمرانی خوب بر بی‌ثباتی سیاسی کشورهای عضو اوپک پرداخته است. روش آزمون فرضیه‌ها، روش داده‌های پانل پویا (GMM) طی دوره زمانی 2010 تا 2018 در کشورهای عضو اوپک می‌باشد. در این پژوهش از شش مؤلفه کنترل فساد، اثربخشی دولت، کیفیت قوانین، قانون‌‌مداری، اعتراض و پاسخگویی و ثبات سیاسی/ عدم خشونت با عنوان شاخص‌های حکمرانی خوب استفاده کرده و به همراه درآمدهای نفتی (رانتی) بر شاخص بی‌ثباتی سیاسی به صورت جداگانه بررسی شده است. یافته‌ها حاصل از پژوهش نشان می‌دهد که تأثیر دولت رانتیر بر شاخص بی‌ثباتی سیاسی کشورهای اوپک مثبت و معنی‌دار است و تأثیر شاخص‌های پاسخگویی، کارایی دولت، کنترل فساد، حاکمیت قانون و ثبات سیاسی/ عدم خشونت بر بی‌ثباتی سیاسی کشورهای اوپک منفی و معنی‌دار هستند. اثرات تعاملی سه شاخص پاسخگویی، کنترل فساد و حاکمیت قانون به همراه دولت رانتیر نیز بر شاخص بی‌ثباتی سیاسی کشورهای اوپک منفی و معنی‌دار هستند.

کلیدواژه‌ها

دولت رانتیر؛ حکمرانی خوب؛ ثبات سیاسی؛ اوپک

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