Review of Galen Strawson 's Perspective on the Issue of Free Will and its Critiques

جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام

Article 12, Volume 56, Issue 2 - Serial Number 113, February 2025, Pages 285-303   

Document Type: Scientific & Research

DOI: 10.22067/epk.2024.86671.1313

Authors

Tayyebe Gholami^{* 1}; Zahra Khazaee²

¹PhD student, University of Qom

²Professor, University of Qom

Abstract

In daily life, humans adopt their responsibilities with a sense of freedom and choice, but in a world where deterministic laws prevail, this adoption faces challenges. This conflict comes from the belief in a free image of human being. Questions arise as to how humans can be free in coercion and how their will can act freely? If humans have their own free will, this creates their responsibility. But if humans cannot be free, why should they be blamed or praised based on their behavior? Also, in the absence of human free will, the need for moral, legal, and social concepts is challenged. From the perspective of skeptical philosophers such as Galen Strawson, free will and consequently moral responsibility are impossible. Given his fundamental argument, he is skeptical about the possibility of free will. He argues that free will can be possible if the individual is their own essential cause, but the individual is not their own essential cause. This article tries to examine and criticize Galen Strawson's view of freedom from an analytical-descriptive perspective.

Keywords

free will; moral responsibility; essential cause; fundamental argument

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